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Dual-use research of concern (DURC) is the research that is intended for legitimate benefits, but 
also carries a risk of being misused. In this article, the work related to regulation of dual-use influ-
enza virus research involving genetic engineering of the subtype H5N1 has been compared with the 
research involving regulation of biotech crops including Bt cotton and Bt brinjal in India, which 
the author likes to describe as dual-impact research of concern. The growth of biotech crops glob-
ally has been briefly described to highlight that no harmful effects of any biotech crop grown and 
utilized during the last more than 15 years have been reported. The contrast between the responsi-
ble manner in which scientists dealt with the regulation of DURC and the manner in which the civil 
societies and some NGOs have been spreading misinformation, thus creating obstacles in commer-
cialization of biotech crops meant for public good is revealing indeed. Therefore, major efforts are 
needed on the part of scientists and the media to develop good communication system involving 
newspapers, extension workers and TV programmes, which should highlight the merits and safety 
of biotech crops. Scientists should also work hard to convince the government that there is a need 
to reduce the burden of regulation for biotech crops, so that the benefit of this technology could 
reach the masses. 
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DUAL-USE research of concern (DURC) in life sciences 
has been recently defined as research that is intended for 
legitimate beneficial purposes, but also carries a risk of 
being misused for malicious purposes1. This definition 
may be further extended by including research which is 
intended for beneficial purposes, but is likely to pose a 
threat to other living systems and the environment, as is 
perceived in case of biotech crops (also called genetically 
modified (GM) crops). This may be described as dual-
impact research of concern (DIRC), although no such  
expression seems to have been used in the literature. 
There are two main areas of research which may fall 
within the definition of DURC/DIRC: (i) research on  
human genome, human diseases, pathogens and drug  
development in the field of medicine and (ii) develop-
ment of transgenic plants leading to commercialization of 
the so-called biotech crops developed for food, feed, edi-
ble vaccines, molecular farming/pharming, bioremedia-
tion, etc. Both these areas of research largely make use of 
recombinant DNA (rDNA) or genetic engineering (GE) 
technology, which started during 1970s and has now  
become routine in all biology laboratories for the purpose 
of teaching and research. Products of both these areas of 
research fall within the jurisdiction of Indian regulatory 
bodies, including the Review Committee for Genetic  
Manipulation (RCGM) and Genetic Engineering  
Appraisal Committee (GEAC). 
 In this article, an attempt has been made to highlight 
the contrast between the regulation of research involving 
influenza virus on the one hand, and that involving Bacil-
lus thuringiensis (Bt)-cotton and Bt-brinjal on the other. 
The results of the much debated research on influenza  
virus were recently published after a waiting period of 
eight months, whereas cultivation of Bt-cotton even after 
10 years of success is being questioned, and Bt-brinjal is 
facing an indefinite moratorium that was imposed in Feb-
ruary 2010 by the Ministry of Environment and Forests 
(MoEF), Government of India. As an introduction to the 
subject, a brief history of rDNA research and the debate 
of 1970s about the risks involved in using it will be pre-
sented first. This will be followed by a brief account of 
the recent debate on the publication of the research con-
ducted for genetic manipulation of influenza virus to  
assess the possibility of its becoming infective and air 
transmissible among mammals. An account of commer-
cialization of biotech crops globally and at the national 
level in India, including both Bt-cotton and Bt-brinjal, is 
presented next. This will also include an account of the 
debate on the moratorium on Bt-brinjal, which is currently 
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in vogue and is being debated. In the end, we compare  
the regulatory approaches followed in dealing with the  
genetic manipulation of influenza virus on the one hand 
and commercialization of biotech crops on the other. 
There are other areas of research involving ethical and 
biosafety issues, which are also receiving attention of the 
scientists, society and the government, but these aspects 
will not be covered in this article.  
History of rDNA and DURC 
One may recall that during 1970s, after the discovery of 
recombinant DNA technology, questions were raised 
globally whether or not research involving recombinant 
DNA technique was to be allowed in research laborato-
ries. One may also recall the ‘moratorium letter’ that was 
issued during 1974 for putting a halt on research involv-
ing rDNA2, followed by the Asilomar Conference of 
1975, where the scientists themselves (not the activists, 
the stakeholders or the politicians), including the Nobel 
Laureate Paul Berg discussed the risks involved in under-
taking research involving rDNA. At the conference, there 
were apprehensions that the rDNA technique may be used 
either by accident or by mischief leading to emergence of 
pathogens and bioweapons which, according to some, 
could wipe out the human race from the earth. Despite 
these apprehensions, the major conclusion of this confer-
ence was that the research involving use of rDNA should 
be continued, provided appropriate safeguards are used in 
conducting this research. It was also agreed that certain 
experiments with potential risks of serious nature be not 
conducted for the time being, although future research 
may show that these perceived biohazards were really not 
as serious as suspected at that time3. The Asilomar Con-
ference is an example of the responsible manner in which 
scientists performed in undertaking research, which they 
conducted. However, following this transition during 
1970s, the rDNA technique became popular and is now 
used for teaching and research, sometimes even at the 
school level. This has brought about a revolution in the 
field of life sciences education and research, so that every 
area of education and research in life sciences now  
involves a component of rDNA. Had this DURC involving 
rDNA been disallowed or voluntarily dropped during 
1970s due to perceived biosafety risks, we would not 
have witnessed the revolution that occurred in the area of 
life sciences during the last few decades.  
Influenza virus (A/H5N1) and ‘bird flu’ 
The influenza A virus causing seasonal influenza (gener-
ally in the winter months) is a threat to public health and 
takes away ~ 500,000 human lives globally every year. 
The virus is known to undergo extensive changes, some-
times giving birth to a form, which can cause global in-
fluenza pandemics. Such pandemics actually occurred in 
the past during 1918, 1957, 1968 and 2009, causing loss 
to human life4. It is also known that a highly pathogenic 
strain of influenza A virus (genus A; subtype H5N1) that 
emerged during the last decade5 often infected human  
beings causing the so called ‘bird flu’, particularly among 
those who are exposed to infected birds (at least 600 
cases were reported from 15 countries since 2003, of 
which 60% succumbed to this infection). In several coun-
tries in the East (including India), on poultry farms, this 
also led to a major activity involving mass culling of 
chickens, suspected to be infected with this strain of virus 
(hundreds of millions of domestic birds were culled in 
Asia, Middle East, Africa and Europe); there was also a 
panic among humans who, therefore, avoided chickens in 
their non-vegetarian diet; poultry farms thus suffered  
major losses. Despite this, the virus could not be wiped 
out; it persists and continues to be a threat to humans, as 
humans have no immunity against this virus, although in 
mammals, including humans, the virus is not transmitted 
through air. 
 The influenza viruses, including the strain A/H5N1,  
derive their name from the type of proteins they carry, 
which includes the type of haemagglutinin (HA) and the 
type of another surface glycoprotein called neuraminidase 
(NA). It is known that the HA of H5N1 viruses preferen-
tially binds sialic acid (Siaα 2,3) in receptors located on 
the surface of avian cells, but cannot bind sialic acid 
(Siaα 2,6) that is found in the human receptors on the  
surface of cells in the respiratory tract, thus making the 
avian virus incapable of infecting humans. It is also 
known that alterations in HA alone are not enough to 
make H5N1 infective and transmissible among humans, 
since another transmissible influenza A virus is known, 
where transmission among humans is attributed to three 
component proteins, including HA, NA and basic poly-
merase protein 2; it is possible that other viral proteins 
also contribute to mammalian transmissibility. This sug-
gested that HA, NA and polymerase proteins, and possi-
bly some other unknown proteins of avian H5N1 need to 
undergo mutations to acquire the ability to infect and 
transmit through air among humans. Consequently,  
experiments were recently conducted to find out if the 
avian virus can be artificially converted into a strain that 
infects and can be transmitted through air among mam-
mals (ferrets were used as a model for mammals in these 
experiments). It was observed that in order to achieve  
infection and transmissibility through air, one had to alter 
a number of proteins, including HA, NA and polymerase 
through mutations, which had to be introduced artificially 
through genetic manipulation6. 
 In June this year, two important papers, one each in 
Nature (21 June 2012) and Science (22 June 2012) were 
published on experimental manipulation of A/H5N1 virus 
in such a manner that it developed the ability to be trans-
mitted in mammals (ferrets) through respiratory droplets 
released during cough and sneezing. In one of these two 
studies, a team led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the Univer-
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sity of Wisconsin, Madison, and the University of Tokyo 
successfully produced a hybrid virus by taking one gene 
for a viral protein called HA from A/H5N1 and seven 
other genes from another virus H1N1, which is adapted to  
humans and is known to have created a pandemic in 2009 
and 2010. From this stage, four additional mutations in 
the HA gene resulted in a genotype which was transmis-
sible from one caged ferret to another through air; no 
such hybrid strain was available in nature7. The other 
study was conducted by a group led by Ron Fouchier of 
Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 
who started his work with an actual H5N1 virus strain 
from Indonesia and successfully introduced several muta-
tions within the receptor binding site available within the 
HA protein of the virus, which is the first molecule that 
makes contact with the host cell. Two of the several  
mutations that were introduced were already known to 
confer ability on the virus to prefer mammalian cells over 
bird cells. Another mutation that was introduced altered 
the polymerase protein complex in such a way that it will 
facilitate replication of the virus in the cool environment 
of the upper respiratory tract of mammals rather than a 
warmer environment of the bird’s intestine, where the  
virus generally resides. However, these mutations in HA 
and polymerase enzyme were not enough to enable the 
virus to be transmitted through air from one mammal to 
another. This was, therefore, followed by passaging the 
virus through uninfected animals (one ferret to another 
through inoculation), thus producing additional muta-
tions, which conferred upon the virus the ability to be 
transmitted through air from one caged ferret to another8. 
 In the 22 June 2012 issue of Science, the second of the 
above two papers8 was part of a special section that was 
devoted to the issue of whether publication of some of the 
data produced by research on a controversial subject like 
influenza virus should have been withheld to disallow 
free access in public interest9–15. This kind of research has 
been classified as DURC in USA. It is also argued that 
perhaps there should be an international system for  
assessing and handling DURC in a way so that only those 
who need to know should have access to research data, 
which should not be freely accessible. These studies initi-
ated a debate about whether in the first place such studies 
should at all have been conducted, and even if conducted 
should the results be published to become freely accessi-
ble. The major basis of disagreement was that firstly, the 
bioterrorists might use the results to develop bioweapons 
and secondly, that the genetically engineered virus might 
escape by accident and cause a pandemic. The arguments 
in favour of such studies, however, emphasize that such 
studies increase our knowledge, so that we will be better 
equipped to recognize and deal with influenza outbreaks, 
whenever these outbreaks occur in future. The debate on 
DURC has also been described as Asilomar 2. 
 The publication of the above two studies involving  
engineering and transmission of influenza virus to ferrets 
was withheld for about eight months, and was eventually 
allowed by the US Government on the recommendation 
by an independent federal committee called the National 
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) after 
intensive discussion16. In this process, the US Govern-
ment also developed a document described as ‘United 
States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences 
Dual Use Research of Concern’12. This document de-
scribes how different federal departments and agencies 
will assess the risks and benefits involving 15 agents 
from the select list of ~ 80 agents, and then take a consi-
dered decision whether or not to allow conduct and  
funding of such research projects, if they fall within the 
definition of DURC. It was also emphasized in this 
document that the research falling within the definition of 
DURC should be allowed and the results published only 
when the benefits to society at large overweigh the 
risks/harms to national security and the society. 
World-wide growth of biotech crops  
(including Bt-cotton in India) 
Biotech crops are the crops that are derived through the 
use of rDNA technology. Plant breeders would like to 
avoid using the popular terms ‘genetically modified 
crops’ or ‘transgenic crops’, since all cultivars resulting 
through plant breeding are genetically modified, and in 
all cases genes are transferred from one source to another, 
the only difference being the use of rDNA technology for 
gene transfer in the case of biotech crops. Perhaps  
another distinction is that the introgressed gene involved 
in a biotech crop could not have been transferred by con-
ventional methods of plant breeding. But it is only the 
rDNA technology, which really makes the distinction, 
because, even when the gene is transferred from the same 
species (cisgenic plants), and even when no transgene is 
carried by the product, it is still classified as a biotech 
crop, if rDNA technology is involved17,18. 
 Biotech crops have shown a remarkable rate of adop-
tion for cultivation during the last 15 years. Starting in 
1996 with 2 million hectares (m ha) of land occupied by 
biotech crops, the global area occupied by biotech crops in 
2011 approached 160 m ha (13% increase over the previ-
ous year) and involved 16.7 million farmers in 29 coun-
tries, although the traits involved for improvement mainly 
included either herbicide resistance or insect resistance. 
Almost invariably, the insect resistance was due to one or 
more cry genes derived from Bt, which are lethal to cer-
tain classes of insects, and the herbicide (glyphosate)  
resistance was often due to microbial genes that would  
either modify the herbicide target, or will detoxify  
the herbicide itself. In some cases (42.2 m ha of the 
160 m ha), the traits for insect resistance and herbicide 
resistance were also stacked together (for more details, 
see James19). It is also known that in USA in 2010, 85% 
of corn and 90% soybean acreage was planted with bio-
tech corn and biotech soybean respectively20, suggesting 
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that in due course of time, corn and soybean crops in 
USA will be represented exclusively by biotech crops. 
Second generation of biotech crops 
Only recently, biotech crops carrying genes for resistance 
against either abiotic stresses or a variety of fungal and 
bacterial diseases are being developed. However, the pro-
gress in this direction is rather slow, the first such biotech 
crop being Monsanto’s drought-resistant biotech maize 
(MON 87460) that was approved in December 2011 by 
USDA for commercial cultivation in USA, even though 
questions have been raised about its performance in the 
field21. These biotech crops are described as the ‘second-
generation biotech crops’, which also include biotech 
crops to be used for biofuels, industrial chemicals and 
even for biopharmaceuticals. 
 For the development of second-generation biotech 
crops, additional novel biotechnological approaches have 
also become available, which include the following: use 
of zinc-finger nucleases (ZFN) and transcription activator-
like endonucleases (TALE) for genetic engineering,  
oligonucleotide-directed mutagenesis (ODM), RNA-
dependent DNA methylation (RdDM), grafting on GM 
rootstocks, reverse breeding (involving silencing of  
recombination during meiosis), agroinfiltration (transgene 
is introduced only in some tissues) and MADS box gene-
accelerated flowering22,23. Several of these new approaches 
fall within the category of targeted genetic modification 
(TagMo), so that questions are being asked if these prod-
ucts resulting due to the use of TagMo will fall outside 
the definition of biotech crops for the purpose of regula-
tion24. It is obvious from this shift from first-generation 
to second-generation biotech crops (sometimes involving 
the use of newer approaches) that we are entering into a 
second phase of the development and commercialization 
of biotech crops, despite the fact that the debate on the 
first-generation biotech crops is not yet over. This second 
phase has been described25 as Agbiotech 2.0 and will be a 
challenge for both the developers of biotech crops and the 
regulators, since the civil society advocacy groups in  
several parts of the world including India will keep on 
working to block the process of progress in science and 
technology for crop breeding. 
Ten years of successful cultivation of Bt-cotton  
in India 
Bt-cotton in India is an extraordinary example, where 
pressure from the farmers, who illegally grew this crop 
prior to its approval by the regulatory authorities, facili-
tated the approval for commercial cultivation of this bio-
tech crop in 2002. Following the regulatory approval, 
more than 1,000 Bt-cotton hybrids were released during 
the last 10 years, so that a record 11 m ha (> 90%) of the 
total cotton area of 12.2 m ha was occupied by Bt-cotton 
during the year ending June 2012. It was only due to  
Bt-cotton that the total production of cotton in 2012 
reached 35.6 million bales (170 kg/bale), with an average 
yield of 496 kg/ha (the domestic consumption is only 
~ 28 million bales, leaving a surplus of ~ 15 million 
bales); the average yield was still higher in earlier years, 
approaching over 550 kg/ha in 2007. Also, the pesticide 
consumption due to use of Bt-cotton has gone down by at 
least 50%, this fall ranging from 46% in 2002 to 26% in 
2006 and 21% in 2009 and 2010. The number of Bt-
cotton farmers increased from 20,000 in 2001–02 to 
seven million in 2011–12, representing ~88% of the eight 
million cotton farmers in 2011–12 (refs 26 and 27). This 
dramatic change in cotton cultivation has been described 
by some as ‘white gold revolution’. 
 More recently, the economic impact of Bt-cotton in  
India has also been examined through a systematic 
study28. The authors have shown that Bt-cotton caused a 
24% increase in cotton yield through reduced pest dam-
age and a 50% gain in cotton profit among farmers with 
smallholdings. According to them, this led to a positive 
economic and social development in India and improved 
the standard of living of the farmers who were growing 
Bt-cotton. Similar results were reported in another inde-
pendent study. The Council of Social Development 
(CSD) also conducted a study (involving socio-economic 
impact of Bt-cotton), commissioned by Bharat Krishak 
Samaj, and reported a decline of 23% in the use of pesti-
cide during 2002–2009, although the level of decline in 
pesticide consumption has slowed down during the last 
two years29. Also, the cotton area and production may 
drop in India this year (2012–13) due to global fall in 
prices, the export policy of the Government of India and 
the subsidy provided for cotton export in USA, so that 
farmers may shift to other crops. However, this trend has 
nothing to do with the merit or demerit of Bt-cotton per 
se, although several civil society advocacy groups, in-
cluding some NGOs, may like to attribute this to the fail-
ure of Bt-cotton. 
 Despite the above success of Bt-cotton in India, the 
controversy about commercial cultivation of biotech crops 
continues, and more often the negative attitudes domi-
nate, mainly due to several civil society groups, although 
sometimes even a section of the scientific community 
also joins them and disagrees with the majority opinion in 
favour of biotech crops. The negative attitudes have  
recently been reinforced by the report of Parliamentary 
Standing Committee placed before the Parliament on 9 
September 2012. Earlier, in a meeting during 11–12 June 
2012, organized by CSD, Centre for Environment Educa-
tion (CEE) and Centre for Sustainable Agriculture (CSA) 
to examine the results of 10 years of Bt-cotton in India, 
mixed opinions were expressed by developers, farmers, 
NGOs and some scientists; however, in the concluding 
session, the Minister Jairam Ramesh accepted that Bt-
cotton in India has been a success (although he also  
emphasized on the need for further work), though many 
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advocacy groups still keep on arguing against the benefits 
accrued to the farmers due to cultivation of Bt-cotton30. 
The fate of Bt-brinjal in India: an indefinite  
moratorium 
Bt-brinjal was developed by M/s Maharashtra Hybrid 
Seeds Company Limited (Mahyco) through introgression 
of the Bt gene cry1Ac to provide tolerance to the fruit and 
shoot borer (FSB), a major pest that attacks brinjal crop 
throughout its life cycle. An appropriate selected biotech 
event, EE-1 was subjected to field trials and after due 
consideration of the biosafety data by RCGM, and the re-
port of an ‘Expert Committee on Bt Brinjal’ (called EC-I), 
large-scale trials (LST) for two seasons were allowed. In 
order to study the findings of all the studies conducted by 
that time on Bt-brinjal event EE-1 (including LST) and to 
examine the concerns expressed by several groups, the 
GEAC again constituted an ‘Expert Committee’ (called 
EC-II) to examine all aspects. After due consideration of 
the report of EC-II, on 14 October 2009, GEAC took a 
decision in favour of commercialization of Bt-brinjal, but 
chose to send their recommendation to MoEF for a final 
decision. 
 The MoEF placed the recommendation of GEAC as 
above on the web and invited comments. The then minis-
ter in the MoEF, Jairam Ramesh, also had seven meetings 
with the public in different regions of the country to 
know the acceptability of Bt-brinjal by the consumers. He 
also invited comments from the Chief Ministers of differ-
ent states and sought opinions of some selected scientists 
and civil society organizations (CSOs), including some 
NGOs. After considering the information thus collected 
from different sources, the minister announced his decision 
for a moratorium on Bt-brinjal on 9 February 2010, a day 
before the date earlier fixed for the announcement. In order 
to strengthen the decision and to deal with similar cases in 
future, the name of GEAC was also changed from ‘Genetic 
Engineering Approval Committee’ to ‘Genetic Engineer-
ing Appraisal Committee’, thus in a way withdrawing the 
powers of approval from this regulatory body. 
 The moratorium on Bt-brinjal announced by MoEF had 
a mixed reaction, the civil society advocacy groups appre-
ciating this decision, but developers and majority of the 
scientific community considering it unfortunate. The report 
of the MoEF, which was the basis of indefinite morato-
rium on Bt-brinjal, was reviewed by Kameswara Rao31, 
who believed that the order of MoEF was not based on 
science, but was politically motivated; this view is shared 
by majority of the scientific community, although MoEF 
and many NGOs may disagree. Several commentaries on 
GM crops in general, and on Bt-brinjal in particular (both 
for and against), have also appeared in the columns of 
Current Science32–38. The diverse opinions and views 
which have been expressed with respect to the utility of 
Bt-brinjal for the farmers and consumers in India, and 
also with respect to whether or not the moratorium on Bt-
brinjal should be lifted, have been collated by Yadugiri39. 
 In an interview to Current Science40, Jairam Ramesh 
also admitted that he had a bias against GM crops, and 
that he would have swallowed his biases, if there was an 
overwhelming view of the scientists and the states in  
favour of Bt-brinjal. In this interview, he also mentioned 
three issues, namely safety, acceptability and seed con-
trol40. As we know, the question of safety was examined 
by RCGM and EC-II to the satisfaction of GEAC, but 
their findings seem to have been questioned by the minis-
ter, while taking the decision for a moratorium. The pro-
cess of assessing the acceptability followed by the minister 
was also not flawless, since the audience to whom the 
question of acceptability was addressed did not have full 
knowledge either about the process or the product; they 
were instead being constantly fed with biased information 
that was not based on science. The only issue then left 
pertains to seed control, and for this we need to compare 
Bt-brinjal with Bt-cotton, where the seed is now  
being controlled by a number of Indian seed companies, 
although a major part is still controlled by Monsanto, 
which is the most important company controlling the bio-
tech seed market in India. Despite this, it may not be  
appropriate to deprive Indian farmers and the consumers 
of the benefit of a technology, just because it is dominated 
by an MNC. If this were to be so, we would not have seen 
the kind of economic growth that we witnessed in our 
country during the last 20 years due to economic liberali-
zation (for example, in the auto industry, we would never 
have the kind of growth we witnessed, if the government 
had not allowed entry of foreign companies). 
Inter-Academy report on GM crops 
After the moratorium imposed on Bt-brinjal on 9 February 
2010, the Minister Jairam Ramesh and Planning Commis-
sion member K. Kasturirangan had asked the six national 
academies to assess the safety and viability of growing 
biotech crops in the wake of countrywide protests over 
the approval for Bt-brinjal, which was the first biotech food 
crop that would have been commercialized. The six aca-
demies that were involved in the task included are: Indian 
Academy of Sciences (IASc), Indian National Science 
Academy (INSA), National Academy of Agricultural Sci-
ences (NAAS), National Academy of Medical Sciences 
(NAMS), Indian National Academy of Engineering (INAE) 
and National Academy of Sciences, India (NASI). 
 A meeting of some selected fellows/scientists from all 
the six academies, who were experts on the subject of 
crop breeding and biotech crops, was convened at the 
INSA premises on 1 June 2010. As many as 46 scientists, 
most of them fellows from different academies took part 
in the meeting (including the author of this write-up), 
where eight formal presentations were made, followed by 
detailed discussion. An overwhelming support in favour 
of commercialization of GM crops was witnessed in this 
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meeting. There were just a few scientists who spoke 
against the biotech crops, but the opinion of at least some 
of these scientists could be politically motivated. 
 An Inter-Academy report jointly prepared by the six 
academies was made public in September 2010, without 
either convening another meeting to discuss this report, 
or first circulating the report among the fellows present at 
the meeting on 1 June 2010. This report invited adverse 
comments from many, including CSOs and the academia, 
since apparently sections of the report were copied from 
an article earlier written by a NAAS fellow and himself a 
developer of biotech crops. Jairam Ramesh dismissed this 
25-page report, saying that ‘it does not appear to be the 
product of rigorous scientific evaluation’. Therefore, the 
Academies withdrew their controversial report, revised it, 
and released their updated report in January 2011.  
According to some, the updated report was worse than 
the original report41. The report appears to some as one-
sided and in favour of the seed companies, but it certainly 
reflects the majority opinion of the scientific community 
having nothing at stake and having nothing to do with the 
seed companies involved in developing Bt-brinjal. 
Role of science, society and government in  
DURC/DIRC 
In all research activities falling within the definition of 
dual-use/effect-research, the relationship between science 
and society becomes important. The research of this kind 
is always debated amongst the stakeholders, including 
scientists, businessmen, general public and politicians. 
This calls for a role of the government to regulate, but not 
overregulate such research. The provisions of this regula-
tion differ in USA and Europe; in India, we are some-
where in between, but more like Europe, where the merits 
of biotech crops have largely been overlooked. Let us  
examine the issue using the examples of the 1975 Asilomar 
Conference, the recent research on influenza virus  
(described by some as Asilomar 2), and the case of Bt-
brinjal, which is currently facing an indefinite moratorium. 
 In the case of rDNA discussed at the Asilomar Confer-
ence (held in 1975), and also in case of the research con-
ducted on influenza virus A/H5N1 (published in 2012), 
the debate was initiated by the scientists, who themselves 
cautioned against the possible risks and decided to post-
pone research or publication of their results. While draw-
ing a contrast between this situation and that of the 
biotech crops, one would find that while in the case of the 
rDNA and influenza virus debate, scientists and the gov-
ernment worked together in a responsible manner, in the 
case of biotech crops, particularly Bt-brinjal in India,  
the government did not take the scientific community into 
confidence (instead a group of scientists supporting the 
minister’s biased view were picked up). Also, even after 
the so-called shoddy Inter-Academy report, the govern-
ment made no further efforts to know the opinion of the 
majority of scientists, who did not get a chance to see the 
report before it was released. The scientists would like to 
ask the government, that if the Inter-Academy report was 
not a result of rigorous scientific evaluation (as the minis-
ter said), why were further efforts not made to get a report 
with the desired rigorous evaluation? Instead of doing 
this, the government constituted a Parliamentary Standing 
Committee, which once again submitted a report against 
biotech crops. 
 It has also been recognized that any overregulation of 
DURC/DIRC may lead to slow growth of useful research, 
which may be necessary for the country to avoid disasters 
that may follow if such research is not conducted; these 
disasters may involve occurrence of pandemic diseases in 
the field of human healthcare and lack of food and nutri-
tional security in the field of agriculture. The resolution 
by the US government to allow recent publication of the 
results of the two studies on influenza virus7,8, and the  
deregulation of a number of GM crops earlier are exam-
ples of how the government can take necessary action in 
the interest of the society. 
 The government has the responsibility to recognize the 
benefits and compare these benefits with the perceived 
unknown risks. However, in many such cases, where  
research is allowed on the basis of balancing benefits and 
risks, the issue of ‘mitigating the risks’ is sometimes 
overlooked and does not receive due attention which it 
deserves. The US policy on DURC actually calls for a 
risk assessment and also for the necessary measures for 
mitigating these risks in consultation with the institution 
and the scientists involved in conducting this research. It 
is also recognized that it is difficult to draw a line between 
acceptable and unacceptable risks, since these risk assess-
ments are often subjective, and made by individuals with 
different backgrounds, beliefs and opinions42. In the case 
of Bt-brinjal, perhaps no effort has been made so far to 
examine the balance between benefits and risks, and to 
see if the benefits outweigh the risks, which could  
perhaps be mitigated through appropriate action. 
 One of the major problems in the acceptance of GM 
technology for commercial cultivation is also the igno-
rance of public (both educated and uneducated) about the 
technology. Therefore, there is a need of communication 
programmes through extension workers, newspapers and 
television to educate the public. Also, it has not been pos-
sible to discuss among scientists, whether we should fol-
low the principle of substantial equivalence (as done in 
USA) or the precautionary principle, which sometimes 
becomes almost preventive (as done in Europe). Accord-
ing to some, it is unfortunate that the government in India 
is taking a promotional approach for biotech research, but 
is using a precautionary/preventive approach in commer-
cializing the same. Unfortunately, some scientists like 
Pushpa Bhargava and M. S. Swaminathan, whose views 
are used by the government to support their action of 
moratorium on Bt-brinjal, also recommend the use of pre-
cautionatry principle, although a large section of enlight-
ened plant breeders all over the world agree that there is 
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hardly any difference between a conventionally bred cul-
tivar and a biotech crop. Also, when some scientists like 
G. Padmanaban and Mahtab S. Bamji suggest for a lim-
ited release of Bt-brinjal, others like Pushpa Bhargava see 
the risks involved citing examples of Parthenium and water 
hyacinth39, which became noxious weeds, without realiz-
ing that there is a difference between a crop and a weed, 
and that a crop is grown by the supplied seed. We know 
that this seed supply can certainly be stopped through  
denotification of the variety under section 5 of the Seed 
Act, 1996. Hundreds of crop varieties that were released 
for cultivation have been rejected by the farmers, and are 
not grown now and no seed for these varieties is produced. 
Therefore, the argument that ‘for a plant there is no such 
thing as a limited release’, does not seem to be valid. 
Regulatory burden: can it be reduced? 
Regulation is the main burden on the developers in terms 
of time and cost, partly due to the demands of a section of 
civil society, which can perhaps never be fulfilled 
(chronic toxicity tests). According to some estimates, the 
cost of developing the first biotech variety in a crop could 
approach close to Rs 50 crores (6.8 million Euros) in 
Europe43, and the situation in India may not be very dif-
ferent. As in Europe, rules are often framed, which dis-
criminate against biotech crops, rather than those, which 
facilitate development of biotech crops in the interest of 
public good. Also, there is no evidence that the biotech 
crops pose higher level of risk than the conventionally 
bred cultivars. In view of this, one could think of making 
the regulatory system to be less stringent and less expen-
sive, thus encouraging the seed companies and the public  
institutions to spend more energy and effort towards the 
development of novel biotech crops to meet the food and 
nutritional demands of the future. 
 It seems that no experiments have been conducted to 
demonstrate the manner in which the transferred gene in a 
biotech crop could become a hazard, although some  
efforts have been made to suggest harmful effects of bio-
tech crops on the non-target insects or on rats/mice used as 
human models. Even in these cases, most experiments con-
ducted were later proved to have had inherent flaws, and 
the results of these experiments could never be verified. 
 In view of the experience of more than 15 years, the 
governments in the developing countries like India should 
now be able to relax some of the regulatory provisions, if 
no evidence is available about the risks involving these 
regulatory provisions. For instance, a number of experi-
ments have demonstrated that although pollen transfer 
from biotech crops does take place, the consequences of 
this pollen flow, even if followed by hybridization with 
related or wild species, could not be alarming. Therefore, 
one could examine whether or not pollen-flow studies are 
necessary. 
 The major environmental risks that are generally per-
ceived to be associated with the commercialization of 
GM crops include the following: (i) adverse effect on 
non-target organisms; (ii) weediness and invasiveness of 
GM crop; (iii) transfer of transgene to wild species due to 
pollen transfer; (iv) development of resistance in insects 
against Bt endotoxin, and in weeds against herbicides and 
(v) loss of biodiversity and disruption of ecosystem. 
There are other issues like allergenicity and toxicity on 
one hand, and social, ethical and economic issues on the 
other, which may not fall within the jurisdiction of 
MoEF. However, substantial evidence is now available to 
suggest that at least some of the environmental risks have 
no scientific basis, and therefore regulatory tests involv-
ing these risks (e.g. pollen transmission) can be dispensed 
with. But we know that the civil society advocacy groups 
will never let this happen. 
Role of MoEF and MoA in regulation of GM crops 
The regulatory system in India is currently managed by 
three ministries – Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Minis-
try of Science and Technology (MoST) and MoEF. How-
ever, the final approval for commercial cultivation of 
biotech crops rests with MoEF, which collates informa-
tion from RCGM, MEC and ICAR, and issues permission 
for field trials and finally for commercial cultivation. 
This appears unusual, because, release of all crop varie-
ties for commercial cultivation after necessary breeding 
work is under the jurisdiction of MoA. In USA, the issue 
of environmental impact of a biotech crop is examined by 
the Environment Protection Agency (EPA), the toxicity 
and allergenicity aspects of biotech foods are examined 
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and  
approval for commercial cultivation is finally granted by 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). If 
this is so, why should the authority for final approval for 
commercial cultivation of GM crops in India rest with 
MoEF, which should examine only the regulation for  
environmental risks. 
Conclusions 
The regulation of DURC/DIRC is important for the scien-
tists, society and government in any country, and requires 
immediate attention. The recent developments involving 
research conducted on genetic engineering of influenza 
virus to study whether or not the virus strain H5N1 can 
acquire the ability to infect and to become transmissible 
among mammals, prompted the author to see a contrast 
between the approach used in USA in dealing with the 
regulation of this research and the regulation of biotech 
crops in Europe and India. The contrast became all the 
more pronounced, in view of the recent report of the Par-
liamentary Committee Panel on agriculture, which has 
opposed the introduction of GM food crops, including Bt-
brinjal. Fortunately, they also recommend a professional 
evaluation of these developments, their possible causes 
and consequences by an expert committee of eminent  
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scientists. When an evaluation is done, there will be ques-
tions regarding how to select these eminent scientists who 
would conduct the evaluation, because those who think 
and speak against the GM crops are seen to be biased in 
favour of the civil society groups, that are inherently  
opposed to biotech crops, and would not like to see any 
merit in these crops. In contrast, eminent scientists who 
favour the commercialization of biotech crops are per-
ceived as supporters of MNCs like Monsanto. The only 
alternative then is to conduct experiments to show that 
there is merit in biotech crops and if there is any risk, it 
should be demonstrated through specially designed  
experiments. Since during the last 16 years, cultivation of 
biotech crops in 29 countries did not suggest any risk, we 
should at least change our attitude from ‘risk, if not 
proved harmless’ to ‘harmless, if not proved risky’. This 
is necessary, because, it is almost impossible to prove 
that a product is harmless, except that you can test a 
product for some of the known risks. But, we know that 
even products of conventional plant breeding may prove 
to be harmful, as shown in the case of some potato varie-
ties with toxins, a celery strain which causes skin rashes 
and certain improved wheat varieties which were shown 
to cause the coeliac disease. But using these examples, 
we cannot start subjecting all plant breeding to the same 
regulatory system, which is being currently used for bio-
tech crops. Unless the government of India takes difficult 
decisions and allows GM crops to be commercialized (as 
done earlier in case of the nuclear deal), future genera-
tions will hold the present generation responsible for not 
having done what was expected of them. 
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